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Abstract
Gao, Xi
Growth Engine: Effects of China’s Trade and Investment on the Economies of East and
Southeast Asia

The emergence of China as an economic superpower through globalization and
fragmentation of production has impacted global trade relations, particularly in East and
Southeast Asia (ESA). China has become a major trading partner for ESA economies not only
through exporting goods to ESA countries, but also importing goods to satisfy China’s energy
and consumer needs. This thesis studies the impact trade and investment relationships with China
have on ESA economies. This study will include ten developed and developing ESA countries:
Japan, Republic of Korea, Singapore, Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, Vietnam, Cambodia, Lao
DPR, and Philippines. The results obtained include: 1) the effects that exports to China and
inbound FDI from China have on ESA countries’ real GDP per capita, 2) the impact of trade and
investment with China depends on the countries’ degree of advancement, 3) emphasis on the
importance of regional cooperation in Asia.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
A. Motivation
With the rise and further opening of the Chinese economy, China is playing an
increasingly important role on global trade relations, particularly in East and Southeast Asia
(ESA). Due to globalization and fragmentation of industrialization, China has become a
manufacturing hub, attracting trade and foreign direct investments into ESA. As a result, China
has grown to be an economic growth engine, with an average GDP growth of 10.3% in the
decade between 2003-2013, ranking China as the seventh country with the highest average GDP
growth at the time. Although China’s growth rate is no longer in the double digits, China is still
growing at 7.7% (IMF). China has significantly transformed into an economic power since its
closed economy days, the question of whether China has become a growth engine for ESA
remains. This thesis studies the impact of China’s trade and investment on the economies of East
and Southeast Asia (ESA). The value of China’s impact on ESA is more than just economic
gains, but also the strengthening of the Asian regional power.

B. Countries
The East Asian region includes developed countries such as Japan, Republic of Korea,
Taiwan, and Hong Kong. Due to the complexity of Hong Kong’s and Taiwan’s political
relationship with
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China, my study will not include these territories. The Southeast region includes eight ASEAN
countries: Singapore, Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, Vietnam, Cambodia, Lao, and the
Philippines. Myanmar will not be included due to insufficient data.

C. Structure of the Thesis
I divide the thesis into six chapters. Chapter I and VI are the introduction and conclusion,
respectively. Chapters II, III, IV, and V will study the following:
In Chapter II, I review the current literature related to the impact of China’s growth as a
manufacturing juggernaut on other countries’ growth. Current perspectives on China’s growth
are generally divided into two arguments. On the one hand, China has led to an increase of other
countries’ growth due to shifts in trade patterns and China’s increase need for resources. On the
other hand, China with its large and thus cheap labor force is a competitor to other ESA
countries. I find that China’s economic relations differ with countries, based on each country’s
degree of advancement. Therefore, the literature review is organized through the categorization
of ESA countries into Advanced, Dragons, and Tigers.
In chapter III, I explain the theories behind export-led growth and FDI-led growth,
followed by the characterization of China as both a major importer and investor.
In Chapter IV, I introduce the econometric model used in this study:
!"#!!"#!!"#$%" = !! + !! !"#$%&!" + !! !"#!" + !
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This economic model is based on two main variables that impact economic growth, exports and
inbound FDI from China. The importance of these variables, along with other growth
contributors such as openness, human capital, and M2 are explained in this section.
In Chapter V, I analyze the results of fixed-effect regressions using a series of methods
such as the lagged effect to reduce omitted variable bias and serial correlation.
Through such analysis, I wish to see whether China’s growth has benefitted the other
countries within ESA or is China regarded as a global competitor. This paper tries to provide
answers to the following questions:
•

Does China’s rise in trade and investment have an effect on Asian countries’ growth?

•

Has the effect been positive? Or has China’s global trade expansion been achieved at the
expense of other economies in ESA?

•

Will China’s growth effects lead to increased regional cooperation?

•

How does China’s growth affect developed and developing countries differently?

•

Does the host country’s financial institutions, human capital, and openness determine an
increase in GDP?

!
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CHAPTER II
LITERATURE REVIEW

My thesis specifically studies the impact of China’s trade and investments on economic
performances of ESA economies. China’s rapid growth, success in world export markets, and
heavy absorption of foreign direct investments (FDI) in the past decades are driven by
international segmentation of production processes within Asia where China acts as a major
partner in production networks, utilizing its large, cheap labor force. As a result, China’s growth
as a global manufacturing base has changed the global trade pattern, particularly affecting
countries in the Asian region. Not only has China entered the Asian economy as a competitor,
but also a contributor of economic growth within the region. China’s open economy and growth
has affected countries in Asia differently. These countries can be divided into three sectors: the
advanced economy (Japan), the Dragons, which encompass the first tier of New Industrialized
Economies (NIEs) (South Korea, Singapore, Hong Kong, and Taiwan), and the Tigers, which
encompass the second tier of NIES (Malaysia, Philippines and Thailand). The two main
opposing arguments characterized in many of the papers are: China is a growth engine for the
ESA region vs. China is a competitor for other ESA countries, based on the nature of trade links
between China and ESA countries.
In several papers (Li 2006, Fernald 2004, Lall 2004), China is claimed as the growth engine
in ESA due to the benefits Chinese manufacturing has brought to ESA. ESA countries share
mutual benefits from the growing incomes of Chinese consumers and from the potential of
greater integration of product lines across the region, both of which are reflected in the
expanding intra-regional trade in Asia. The growing needs and income of Chinese consumers
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have transformed China into a major importer of the ESA countries. China’s tremendous growth
means export opportunities from the rest of Asia, particularly since WTO accession was
completed in December 2001. In addition, as China continues its rapid development, other
economies in the region have an incentive to try to move up the value chain as their comparative
advantages shifts to higher-value added, less labor-intensive industries. Taiwan, for example, is
attracting more investment in high-tech research facilities as opposed to pure manufacturing, and
Malaysia is trying to broaden the scope of its manufacturing sectors to include biotechnology and
other emerging technologies. Despite these benefits, China and ESA countries also compete for
trade in the global market. Competition exists, particularly between China and other developing
nations in producing goods that are substitute goods (Fernald 2004).
In this chapter, I will explain the change in global trade dynamics as China rises as a
manufacturing juggernaut in ESA. This chapter is divided by China’s relationship with the
different tiers of economies in the ESA region and China’s impact on FDI and trade relations.
A. Change in Advanced Economies: Japan
B. Change in First Tier NIEs: Dragons (South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore.
C. Change in 2nd Tier NIEs: Tigers (Thailand, Malaysia, and Indonesia)
D. China Attracting FDI and Trade to ESA

A. Change in Advanced Economies: Japan
China’s integrated role in global trade as a manufacturing juggernaut has changed
traditional trade between advanced economies from bilateral to triangular trade. Before China’s
participation, Japan's final goods were directly exported to North American and European
markets. Now, Japanese products, particularly in parts and components and semi-finished goods
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are first sent to China where they are processed and assembled and then re-exported to Western
markets and also to Japan.
When China’s market opened to the world, Western and Japanese firms chose to move
high volumes of production to low-cost sites to China to take advantage of its growing domestic
market and cheap labor costs (Sturgeon & Leister 2004). As a consequence, Japan's trade with
China rapidly increased, while Japanese imports from advanced economies, and mainly from the
US had decreased. Not only did Japan’s trade shift to low-cost sites; U.S. markets also took steps
in the same direction, imports shifted in favor of low-cost suppliers in the region (Mexico) and in
China, and away from Japan and the Dragons. The share of imports from China in total
manufacturing imports of the rest of the world (total world imports less imports of China)
increased from 2.7% to 12.6% between 1992/3 and 2005/6. This increase contrasted with a
persistent decline in world market share of Japan and other advanced industrialized nations such
as Canada, U.S. and EU (Athukorala 2009).
When China initially integrated into the global trade, it was not competing with advanced
countries such as Japan, but rather their relationship can be interpreted as a shift in trade relations
and specializations due to global production networks. For example, China’s exports of
machinery increased at a compound rate of 13.2 % during 1992-2006, shifting its world market
share from a mere 1.3% to 11.3%. The corresponding market share losses have come solely from
Japan and other developed countries. Japan’s loss, however, can be defined more as its role
shifting away from the export and import of final goods due to fragmentation of production.
When total machinery exports are disintegrated into components and final products, it is clear
that China’s exports are heavily concentrated in final assembly (Athukorala 2009). Such as the
case that although China has displayed a rapid increase in exports of high-tech products in recent
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years, the actual value added in China is generally not in high-tech activities, but rather
assembling.
China’s new role in global trade relations brought about changes throughout ESA. The
first change was that Japan's imports of final goods shifted from advanced economies to China.
As a result, China has become Japan's largest supplier of consumption goods, accounting for 1/3
of its global imports in 2003 (against 17% ten years earlier). China’s gain was at the expense of
the Dragons, which lost most of their market share. Japan's imports of capital goods have also
shifted to China, which increased its share from 4% to 26%, at the expense of NAFTA and
Europe (the cumulated share of these two regions fell from 75% in early nineties to 45% in
2003). Most of the capital goods exported from China consisted of electronic products
(telecommunication equipment and computers) that are part of the value-added chain. Japan’s
main importing partner changed from the US, Europe and the Dragons, to China, creating the
strong trade relations between two major economies in ESA today (Gaulier et, al. 2005).
The above analysis has provided evidence that the major change in East Asia has been
the declining role of major advanced economies, the US and Japan. The underlying factor of
such a trend has been the massive production facilities created in China, which have led to a
redistribution of the final stages of goods.

B. Change in First Tier of NIEs: China vs. Dragons
Similar to Japan’s weakening relationship with the western market, the Dragons’ trade
relations with the North American market also fell. For example, in 2003 NAFTA had ceased to
be the Dragons' major market. This trend is mirrored by the decline of the Dragons in NAFTA
trade. Like Japan's, the Dragons' trade has been affected by the move of production to low cost
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suppliers both in Asia and in America (Gaulier et al., 2005). At the disaggregated level, the
China effect is clearly visible in traditional labor-intensive exports particularly in the clothing
subcategory, corresponding to market share losses by Hong Kong, Korea, and Taiwan. Laborintensive product lines in these countries rapidly shifted to China through strong investment links
from the 1980s (Athukorala 2009).
Fernald (2004) studied classified exports in 48 industries at the three-digit l industry
level, using data from the U.S. Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Economic Analysis
(BEA). In an analysis of competitiveness in the U.S. market, Fernald (2004) further supports the
point made by Gaulier that China’s main competitors were the Dragons rather than the Tigers.
Overall, the results are suggestive of a “flying geese” pattern, in which China and the ASEAN-4
move into the product space vacated by the Dragons. This conclusion is reinforced in each of the
largest industries ranked by the dollar amounts of U.S. imports in 2002: the shares of China and
the ASEAN-4 have moved in the same direction. So contrary to some popular perceptions of
China competing with Tiger economies such as labor-intensive ASEAN countries, China’s gains
in market share came at the expense of the Dragons’ market share. Instead, China took the place
where first tier NIEs in industries that these more advanced economies were relinquishing,
particularly apparel, footwear, and household products. This mirrors a similar move in time,
when the Dragons shifted into the industries that were left behind by the far advanced economy,
Japan. Although Fernald (2004) focused on the U.S. market, similar patterns of displacement of
the NIEs by China and the Tigers are also emerging in the major export markets of Europe and in
Japan.
It would seem that Japan and other developed countries such as the western partners shift
of imports from advanced economies to China leads the Dragon economies to lose out on global
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market share, but on an aggregate level, their numbers have stayed the same. The analysis in
Fernald (2005) study thus far has shown that the Asian NIEs are losing market shares in the U.S.
(and other) markets in almost all categories of goods, but that their overall export growth has
remained quite robust. This raises an obvious question: “Where are exports from the NIEs
going?”
The answer is China’s growing role as a major importing power in ESA, taking in
products from the NIEs at robust rates of growth indicated earlier as one of the many benefits of
China’s growth. This evidence also indicates that the shifting of production facilities to China
from the NIEs likely has boosted NIE exports of intermediates products to China for processing
and export of the finished goods (Fernald 2004). Since the mid 1990s, Dragons' trade with China
has skyrocketed, and in early 2000s, China had become their first largest market and first largest
supplier (Gaulier et al., 2007).
China’s accession into the WTO implied greater trade relations with its existing partners
such as the Dragons. Ianchovichina (2005) dynamic GTAP model assessed the regional impact
of WTO’s accession against a baseline that depicts the growth of the world economy.
Ianchovichina results show that China’s growth after the accession will lead China to increase
demand for metals and petrochemicals from Korea; electronics and other manufactures from
Singapore; light manufactures, petrochemicals, machinery, equipment, and electronics from
Taiwan (China); and metals, petrochemicals, and other manufactures from Japan. Overall, the
Dragons benefit from China’s increased trade as a result of the liberalization of cross-border
trade in services due to WTO accession. Ianchovichina (2005) study was a prediction of the
effects of WTO accession; my research will analyze the actual impact of the WTO accession
through trade data.
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In addition, Ianchovichina mentions that the model does not capture the liberalization of
China's service sectors. Though not captured in the model, the benefits to the Dragons from
liberalization of China's services sectors is expected to be substantial, including transport and
communications, which these economies are well positioned to provide, and it will enhance the
role of Hong Kong (China) as a financial center serving the mainland's investment needs and
providing investment services (Deutsche Bank, 2001).
Moreover, new FDI investment is likely to flow into these expanding capital-intensive
sectors, opposing views that China’s rise will lead to a decline in foreign investment flows into
the Dragon economies. The returns to capital in these countries will rise relative to the baseline
because the NIEs supply semi-finished materials to China, rather than compete with China, and
hence their export prices will tend to rise. Ianchovichina (2005) analysis suggests that with WTO
accession, China will increase its demand for petrochemicals, electronics, machinery, and
equipment from Japan and the NIEs.
Although China’s markets have grown, it is important to keep in mind that the majority
of China’s imports are reprocessed goods owned by multinational corporations in the Western
markets, particularly the U.S. As in the case of Japan, the sourcing strategy of multinational
firms is at the core of trade expansion between the Dragons and China. According to China's
Customs statistics, two-thirds of China's exports to the Dragons and 60% of its imports
correspond to processing activities; foreign affiliates play a dominant part as they handle more
than 60% of trade between the Dragons and China (Gaulier et al., 2005). In other words, China’s
growth and its partners’ grow are still dependent upon the Western markets, contradicting
China’s acclaimed role as a “growth engine” in ESA. Although China depends on the U.S., its
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rise has driven ESA into greater economic advancements and wealth. China’s actions also
reinforced greater interdependence within ESA.
In conclusion, the Dragons, at one tier above China’s manufacturing specialty has been
able to grow alongside China because Dragons’ productivity has shifted to complementing
China’s growth needs. In a way, Dragons and China have grown to be partners in the global
trade process rather than competitors unlike the presumed case between China and developing
countries in ESA.

C. Change in 2nd Tier NIEs: Dragons
While advanced Asian economies have strong complementarities with China which have
boosted investment and trade flows, the Tigers face a different scenario. China is seen less of a
partner in the Tigers’ perspective because they share similar comparative advantages in laborintensive stages of production. This view, however, differs across various sectors. In Gaulier
(2005) research of the electronics and higher industries market, the Tigers have been able to
maintain their market share, proving China to not be a threat. On the other hand, in downward
industries such as clothing, China has dominated the market. China’s success in exporting goods
has been underpinned largely by its comparative advantage in international production arising
from labor abundance. When components are netted out, more than 80% of total Chinese
manufacturing exports from China can still be treated as labor-intensive products (Athukorala
2009).
In Gaulier (2005) analysis, he refers to three ASEAN countries as the Tigers. Malaysia,
the Philippines and Thailand belong to the second wave of “New industrialized economies,”
which have built up industrial capacities largely integrated in global or regional production
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networks. Unlike the shrinking case with Japan and the Dragons’ relationship with the West, in
these Tigers' overall exports, the share of NAFTA has remained stable and large at about 25%
since 1993 and it is still by far their largest market for final good exports, both for consumption
and capital goods. Europe is their second export market for final goods, receiving with more than
20% of these exports. As mentioned earlier, Japan' exports to NAFTA changed; in 1993 (28% of
their imports) declined abruptly to 20% in 2003. Japan lost ground in these markets for P and C,
capital goods and consumption goods, while the other Asian suppliers such as the Tigers and
China have strengthened their positions. According to Gaulier (2005) analysis, China plays an
increasing but small part in the Tigers' trade, remaining below 10%, much smaller than in the
trade of Japan and the Dragons. Gaulier (2005) research only extends to 2003, whereas my thesis
will include data up to 2013.
Contrary to studies that show China overtaking Tiger’s share in world market, Gaulier
(2005) results show that from 1993 to 2003, the Tigers succeeded in increasing slightly their
share in world exports of manufactured products (from 3.0% to 3.5%), despite the surge of
China's exports in this period. Moreover, the three Tigers have maintained their export share in
dynamic and high-quality/price products. When looking at their position in world exports of the
most dynamic products, which is in electronic goods, it stands out that they have not lost market
share to China up to 2003. The Tigers were responsible for 10% of world exports of electronic
products in 2003 against 6.6 % in 1993. Their exports to the US slowed down but this was more
than compensated by the rise of exports to China, and also the Dragons and Europe. In these
sectors, the rise of China implied more trade creation than trade diversion. In world exports of
electrical goods, their share was almost stable from 1993 to 2003.
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Looking at their position by market segments, it appears that from 1995 to 2003, the
Tigers gained share in the upper-market segment of world trade. By contrast, in down-market
products, the Tigers have slightly lost ground while China's exports have significantly increased.
This supports the argument that upgrading the quality of Tigers’ exports is crucial in challenging
China’s growth and dominance. As seen in the cases of Japan and the Dragons, trade
specializations and comparative advantages must shift in response to China’s growth.
Supporting this argument, Li and Song (2006) study concluded that the commodity
composition of ASEAN’s export to China has shifted toward more toward high quality and high
tech products over the past two decades In the early 1990s, ASEAN’s exports to China were
mainly composed of agricultural products and mineral products. Ranked from highest to lowest
in shares of exports to China, they are agricultural, mineral, capital-intensive and labor-intensive
products. However, capital-intensive products had become a major component in ASEAN’s
exports to China by 2000, (similar to Gaulier (2005) results), followed by agricultural and
mineral products. ASEAN’s share of capital-intensive products to China continued to rise to
72.1% in 2003, while shares of agricultural products were falling. Malaysia, Thailand, and
Philippines have experienced such a shift.
The growing bilateral trade relations between China and ASEAN indicate that a new trade
pattern has begun to emerge between China and ASEAN, which has been driven primarily by
seeking economic scale and product differentiation through multinational corporations similar to
the cases of China and the Dragons. The formation of the bilateral Free Trade Arrangement
(FTA) will further strengthen bilateral trade between China and ASEAN. Through a simulation
analysis carried out by employing the computable general equilibrium (CGE) model based on
GTAP, examining how China’s imports from the regional economies will change after the

!
!
!

13!

realization of free trade between China and ASEAN. The stimulation results show that the trade
liberalization between China and ASEAN will enhance considerably ASEAN’s exports to China
especially Philippines and Thailand (Li and Song 2006).
Ianchovichina (2005) study provides a more current observation of the shift in Southeast
Asia, predicting that the Tiger’s growth in the other sectors such as agricultural that will benefit
from China’s growth and thus need for importing goods. Given China's agricultural reforms,
there is also room for expansion of agricultural exports to China, such as oil-seeds and sugar, as
well as basic raw materials, such as timber and energy products. The high intensity of trade
between individual East Asian developing countries and China in 2001 (Ng and Yeats, 2002)
suggests that the planned reductions in the protection of China's markets offer some good
opportunities for exporters in developing economies.
It can be concluded from Gaulier (2005), Li (2006), and Ianchovichina (2005) that researches
on the Tiger economies that the Tigers will benefit from the rapid expansion of China’s economy
due to China’s increasingly demand for foreign resources, including energy and raw materials, to
meet domestic demand, as is clearly demonstrated by the surge in demand in China in products
in recent years. Moreover, in the global trade market, the Tigers will maintain current market
share if they move up the industrial ladder, specializing in technological goods similar to the
Dragons rather than labor-intensive goods. Therefore, the integration of trade between China and
other regional economies largely depends upon their respective underlying comparative
advantages. For example, China relied more upon imports of the most capita-intensive products
and upon exports of labor-intensive products. This is consistent with findings that China has
been importing more and more capital intensive products from other economies in the region.
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Moreover, China relies mostly upon Malaysia for meeting her demand for timber and Thailand
for rubber.

D. China Attracting FDI and Trade
Through analyzing China’s trade with Japan, the Dragons, and the Tigers, it is evident that
China’s dominant role in manufacturing has impacted trade relations in ESA. Although there
exists competition in certain sectors, most countries have been able to benefit from China’s
growing demand in goods and work along with China in value-added chain processes. China’s
growth, however, has also indirectly affected the Asian region’s growth by attracting trade and
investments.
Becoming the largest recipient of FDI in Asia, there were concerns that if the number of FDI
to Asia were a fixed sum, then higher inflows of FDI to China would be at the expense of other
economies (Weiss 2004). Studies have shown (Lee and Plummer (2004) and Busakorn, et al
2005), however, that China’s growth in FDI does not negatively impact other ESA countries.
Lee and Plummer (2004) use a gravity model and are able to reject the hypothesis that China
has had any statistically-significant bearing on outward investment from these OECD countries
outside of the usual channels (i.e. those stipulated in the traditional gravity models, such as size,
wealth, distance, and trade). In addition, Busakorn, et. al. (2005) found that FDI flows to China
were positively related to FDI in other Asian countries; they find that a 10% increase in the
former will lead to a 2-3 percent increase in the latter. This finding can be explained by the
argument that the emergence of China as a major player has created a pivot toward Asia. As a
result, multinational corporations have been using ASEAN to complement its investments in
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China. It can be inferred that China’s success in attracting FDI has helped ASEAN countries by
attracting complementary FDI rather than act as a competitor.
In another study, Chantasasawat et al., (2003) set up a regression model that explained FDI to
eight East and South East Asian economies (1981-2001) by a number of conventional variables
(including measures of market size, tax rates, wage levels, human capital stock, infrastructure
quality and government stability), plus FDI inflows to China. The key result of interest is that
when the level of FDI investment in the eight neighboring economies is examined, it is positively
related to FDI in China. A 105 increase in FDI to China raised FDI in the region by 5-5%
depending on specification. Rather than finding evidence of FDI diversion due to competition, it
appeared that China’s growth led to more FDI in the Asian region. The authors’ result is linked
to production networking amongst international firms in the region, investment in China are
connected with investment elsewhere in the Asia to supply parts and components to plants
located in China. Although China’s pull is not a significant factor in explaining FDI inflows as
compared to measures of trade openness and taxations, it is a contributing factor. Moreover,
China is also increasingly expanding its outwards FDI into other ESA countries.

Conclusion:
The integration of China into the world market has resulted in significant competitive
pressures upon other East Asian economies, but it has at the same time offered enormous
opportunities to ESA economies. These opportunities and the success of trade depends on both
China and her regional trading partners to continue adjusting their industrial structures in the face
of intensifying competition in the regional economies to complement each other’s growth
demands.

!
!
!

16!

Although Asian’s growth still depends on the export of its final products to western
countries, it is undeniable that China’s growth has shaped regionalism and trade in ESA both as a
major manufacturing base and importer. The existing literatures, however, all focus on China and
ESA countries competing in the global market share, my thesis specifically emphasizes on
China’s investments and trade directly affecting individual ESA countries’ growth as measured
by GDP growth using trade data and China’s OFDI data. Has China’s growth directly impacted
GDP growth of ESA economies? Moreover, my thesis will also analyze China’s impact on
current developing countries such as Laos and Vietnam that are not mentioned in many as the
existing literature because their economic growth and openness had just begin. These developing
countries’ growth will further extend the argument of whether China is a competitor for countries
that specialize in labor-intensive goods or has China’s played a supporting role in their growth.
Due to the importance of China’s WTO accession, it is necessary to examine its impact on the
ESA economies which most of the available research has not. Unlike Gaulier, Ianchovichina and
Fernald, my research extends beyond 2003.
In the next section, I will explain the importance of export and FDI in determining growth.
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Chapter III
Growth Theories
The goal of this thesis is to evaluate the impact of China’s rising growth on other ESA
countries through their economic relations. The two main channels of economic relations are
trade and investment. Within trade and investment, this thesis will focus on the importance of
ESA countries’ exports to China and the inbound FDI that ESA countries receive from China.
Section A will explain the Export-Led Growth theory and describe China’s growing role as an
importer in ESA. Section B will explain the relationship between FDI and economic growth and
characterize China’s activeness in outward FDI.

A1. Export-Led Growth Theory
The neoclassical export theory states that exports lead to economic growth, claiming
exports to be the “engine of growth”(World Bank 1993). The main argument of the export-led
growth theory (ELG) is whether a country benefits more through trade policies that are shifted
towards export or through import substitution (Giles and Williams 2000). World Bank (2003)
concludes that export growth and trade-oriented policy are attributed to rapid economic growth
in the “High Performing Asian Economies” (HPAEs)1. All HPAEs, but Taiwan and Hong Kong
are included in our ESA study.
Several components of the trade theory support the ELG proposition. Trade between two
countries can benefit both countries if each country exports the good in which it has a
comparative advantage. Export goods based on the specific good that the country has a
comparative advantage in allows for the exploitation of economies of scale, leading to increased
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1!HPAEs!include!Japan,!Hong!Kong,!the!Republic!of!Korea,!Singapore,!Taiwan,!Indonesia,!
!
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growth. Moreover, expansion and specialization in export productions increase productivity level
and may increase the general level of skills in the export sector. This leads the country to switch
resources such as labor and machines from inefficient non-trade sectors to higher productive
export sectors (Giles and Williams 2000). The industry lifestyle hypothesis describes the
economic growth as a cycle that begins with exports of primary goods. Overtime, economic
growth knowledge changes the structure of the domestic economy, including consumer demand,
which propels exporting more technology intensive products.

A2. China as a Major Importer
As depicted in Graph 1, exports to China from the ten countries of ESA in this study have
all increased since 1992. Developed countries such as Japan and Korea export the most to China.
The 2009 Financial Crisis caused a slight drop in number of exports but by 2010, exports
resumed back to its growth pattern. China’s emergence has had a major positive impact on the
trade of other East Asian countries. For example, over 1995-2001 East Asia’s exports to China
grew at an average annual rate of 11.5 percent, which was far above the corresponding 3.8
percentage growth rate for world trade (Ng and Yeats 2003). China’s success as the
manufacturing machine of the world has resulted in China’s increased economic wealth and
power. In turn, China is increasingly a linchpin of demand. ESA countries benefit from an
increase in Chinese consumption. Increase in GDP per capita of a Chinese citizen has not only
led to increased spending and sophistication of Chinese consumers, but also the opening of a
bigger share of higher-margin marketing and customer service for ESA firms. Chinese demand
strengthens Asian supply chains.
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B1. FDI-Led Growth Theory
FDI is widely accepted as a vehicle for country’s economic growth, in particular for
developing country’s economic growth. For example, FDI in China is positively correlated with
its growth, especially since China is the largest recipient of FDI. FDI contributes to growth
through its role as a conduit for transferring advanced technology from industrialized to the
developing economies (Lim 2001). This transfer, often referred to as knowledge diffusion, leads
to improvements in productivity and efficiency. In developing countries, when multinational
corporations from advanced countries enter the country, they expose new knowledge,
technology, and techniques to the local firms there.

B2. China as Major Investor
Inbound foreign direct investment or otherwise characterized in this research paper as
China’s outward foreign direct investment (OFDI) is a growing factor since the early 2000s.
China’s overseas companies have been gaining momentum in moving international capital
investing across a broad spectrum of sectors ranging from natural resources to manufacturing to
telecommunications and many others. As China’s economy continues to grow, China faces
shortages in almost all raw materials, particularly oil, iron ore, aluminum, and uranium, and it
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must therefore build trade linkages with other resource-rich countries such as ASEAN to secure
supplies. In October 2004, for instance, the National Development and Reform Commission
(NDRC) and the Export-Import Bank of China (EIBC) jointly issued a circular to encourage
overseas investment in specific areas: “(1) resource exploration projects to mitigate the domestic
shortage of natural resources; (2) projects that promote the export of domestic technologies,
products, equipment and labor; (3) overseas R&D centers to utilize internationally advanced
technologies, managerial skills and professionals; (4) mergers and acquisitions that could
enhance the international competiveness of Chinese enterprises and accelerate their entry into
foreign markets (USCC 2011). Growing Chinese investment in ESA countries has important
economic, political, and social implications for China and other countries.
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CHAPTER IV
EMPIRICAL MODEL
This chapter will introduce the framework of the Exports and FDI-led model used in this
study. I will first introduce two previous works that have applied econometric models to study
competitive trade flows in Asia. Then, I will explain the basic model used in this study, followed
by characterizations of variables that affect GDP growth.
A1. Gravity Model
The dominant framework used for analyzing bilateral trade flows is the gravity model.
The basic gravity model dictates that with the increase of the country’s GDP, the trade
relationship between the countries in the same region will increase over time, given also
geographic proximity of the countries in the region, which significantly decreases transportation
costs and thus further perpetuates trade. Previous studies have used the gravity model to
examine the impact of China on the export performance of Asian countries (Eichengreen et al.,
2007; Greenaway et at., 2008). Eichengreen et al. (2004) find that more and less developed
Asian countries are affected by China’s rise differently. China competes with less developed
countries in exporting consumer goods. Although the rapidly growing China needs more
resources and goods, most of the products they import are in capital goods made by more
advanced markets. Greenaway (2008) uses gravity modeling to explore whether and how the
growth of China’s exports is displacing exports of other Asian countries to their markets over the
period of 1990-2003. Greenaway (2008) results were similar to Eichengreen et al. (2004).
Chinese growth has indeed increased China’s imports from the Asian countries in the sample and
but export were mostly from Japan and Korea.
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A2. Econometric Model
Ahearne et al. (2003) examine how China and Kong Kong exports have affected the
growth of four NIEs (Korea, Singapore, Taiwan, and Hong Kong) and ASEAN-4 members.
Using a panel of annual data for 1981-2001, they regress Asian countries’ exports growth on
trading partner’s income growth, movements in real effective exchange rates and China’s real
export growth. Using a VAR estimation of aggregate trade equations, they find that the income
growth of trading partners is critical in explaining trade relations. They find a positive correlation
between China’s export growth and that of other Asian countries, suggesting that China’s exports
do not compete with other Asian countries’ exports overall but compete in specific products.
They traced a shifting of trade patterns taking place, similar to that of the “flying geese” pattern
in which China and ASEAN-4 move into the product space vacated by the NIEs.

B. Export and Inbound FDI-Led Growth Model
Based on the export-led theory and FDI-led theory explained in Chapter III, the following
equation will be used in this study to estimate China’s trade and investment impact on ESA
countries:
(1)

!!! = !! + !! !"#!" + !! !"#!" + !!"
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Dependent Variable for Measuring Growth:
!!" = !"#$!!"#!!"#!!"#$%"
Main Independent Variables:
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!"#!" +

2

= !"#$%&'!!"!!ℎ!"#

!"#!" (+) = !"#$%"&!!"#!!"#$!!ℎ!"#
C. Fixed Effects
With any economic relationship, there are many independent variables that can affect the
dependent variable. Within this relationship, possible variables unique to countries’ real GDP per
capita growth include but are not limited to: openness, development of financial institutions,
legal institution, and infrastructure of countries. With the existence of omitted variables,
coefficient results are biased. Because the proposed model cannot capture all the possible
variables, two approaches are taken in this study. In order to attain more accurate values, country
fixed-effects model can be applied. With a fixed-effects model, each country has its own
intercept. In practice, this means that the coefficients are estimated using information about how
each variable varies over time.

D. Importance of Proxy Variables
The other approach to adjust for unaccounted variable is to include variables that act as
proxies for these various factors such as openness, human capital, and level of financial
institution. In the remaining parts of this section, we will explore the importance as these factors
in determining real GDP per capita growth.

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
2!As these independent variables increase, the dependent variable is also expected to increase.
!
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Proxy Variables:
!"#$!!" + = !"#$$#%%!!"!ℎ!"#!!"#$%&'!
!2! + = !2!!"!!"#$"%&'("!!"!!"#!!"!ℎ!"#!!"#$%&'!
!"! + = ℎ!"#$!!"#$%"&!!"!ℎ!"#!!"!"#$%
D. Importance of Proxy Variables
D1: Openness
The positive relationship between trade openness and economic growth is supported in
several literatures (Edwards 1992, Krueger 1997, Wacziarg and Horn Welch 2003, Harrison
1996). Wacziarg and Horn Welch (2008) analysis based on the new data set suggests that over
the 1950-98 period, countries that liberalized their trade regimes experienced average annual
growth rates that were about 1.5 percentage points higher than before liberalizations. Therefore,
China’s trade interactions with ESA countries are an important factor in determining its impact
on growth. Openness is calculated by the total number of imports and exports between China
and the host country divided by the nominal GDP of the host country.

D2. M2 as a percentage of GDP
M2 is defined as M1 (the sum of currency held by the public and transaction deposits from
the public such as commercial banks, savings and loan associations, savings banks, and credit
unions) plus savings deposits, small denomination time deposits and retail money market mutual
fund shares (Fed Reserve 2014). Measures of money supply have exhibited fairly close
relationships with important economic variables such as nominal gross domestic product (GDP)
and the price level. M2 is also an indicator of financial development. Since Schumpeter (1911),
McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973), the relationship between financial development and
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economic growth has been extensively studied. It is well recognized that financial development
is crucial for economic growth. Calderon and Liu (2003) finds that financial development
generally leads to economic growth and financial deepening contributes more to the causal
relationships in the developing countries than in the industrial countries. Financial deepening
propels economic growth through both a more rapid capital accumulation and productivity
growth.

D3. Human Capital
Since human capital is not measurable estimates of education attainment provide a proxy
for the stock of human capital (Barro and Lee 2011). Education is important. Usually, primary
and secondary enrollment rates or public expenditure on education are used to show the evidence
of high human capital accumulation. These variables are proxies. What is learned in an education
system, from knowledge accumulation to group conducts, as well as education at home, may be
more important in growth. Many analysts have emphasized the crucial importance of human
capital, particularly as attained through education, to economic progress (Mankiw, Romer and
Weil, 1992). A highly educated population mirrors a high level of labor productivity. It also
implies larger numbers of skilled workers and greater ability to absorb advanced technology
from developed countries. The level and distribution of educational attainment also have impact
on social outcomes, such as child mortality, fertility, education of children, and income
distribution (Barro and Lee 1994; Breierova and Duflo 2004; Cutler et al., 2006).
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E. Data and Reason for Period Selection
Trade data used to calculate openness was collected from COMTRADE for the years
1993-2013. COMTRADE provides bilateral trade data (imports and exports) for China and
corresponding countries in nominal US dollars. All GDP data was obtained from WDI of the
World Bank. China’s outward foreign direct investment data including stocks and flows is
obtained from Statistical Bulletin of China’s Outward Foreign Direct Investment by the Ministry
of Commerce of the People’s Republic of China National Bureau of the People’s Republic of
China State Administration of Foreign Exchange (MOFCOM) for the years 2004-2013. The
MOFCOM statistics are the only statistics available with regard to geographical distribution. The
data is mostly presented as aggregated data. Data available for the years 2004-2006 only consists
of non-financial outward investment flows. The exclusion of financial OFDI causes some
problems. For example, the exclusion of financial institution purchases, such as the acquisition of
Indonesia-based Bank Halim by the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, and the USD
1.3bn heavy purchase of Bank of America business in Hong Kong and Macao by China
Construction Bank, both in 2005, leads therefore to an under-reporting of Chinese OFDI (Voss
2011). M2 as percentage of GDP comes from WDI of the World Bank. Human capital using 5year interval of average years of schooling as a proxy was attained from Barro and Lee (2011).
To calculate the approximate data for intervening years, we used a standard formula for capital
accumulation.
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This empirical study focuses on the years 2004-2012 due the limited availability of
China’s OFDI data. In the early 1990s, China’s OFDI was still relatively small because it was
still a low-income developing economy with a small GDP and suffered from an inadequacy of
capital, particularly foreign exchange. Rapid industrialization and its role as the “factory of the
world” made China one of the largest consumers of minerals and ores. To be the “factory of the
world” China needed industrial raw materials and energy security leading China to invest in
resources abroad. When China’s OFDI picked up during the post-2003 period, the principal
reasons contributing to growth in OFDI were the fact that China had grown and industrialized
and that its GDP and industrialization levels had reached impressively high levels. The first
veritable upswing in the OFDI flows occurred after 2003. Initially Chinese MNCs and firms
focused on mining investments in the developing countries. Another surge was seen in 2008,
when the targets were high-technology firms in innovation-intensive areas in the advanced
economies. After the adoption of the “go global” strategy during the Tenth Five-Year Plan
(2001-2005), a structural change in China’s OFDI became obvious (Das 2014). As evidenced,
the major growth and changes in China’s OFDI occurred after the 2000s, which this study
focuses on.

The basic framework of the Export and FDI-led growth model was introduced in this
chapter along with other variables that affect a country’s economic growth. In the next chapter,
we estimate the impact of these variables through the use of fixed-effect OLS regression.
Multiple regressions are run to test for the true estimate model of growth.
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CHAPTER V
EMPERICAL RESULTS
Chapter V will present the empirical results for this study. In section A, we estimate the
export and investment model using ordinary least squares for the sample period 2004 to 2013 for
all ten countries. In 4.1B, we analyze regression results of different groups of countries
according to level of advancement. In 4.1C, additional variable such as openness, M2, and
human capital are applied to the model. In the last section of this chapter, we use the regression
results to build on the importance of regional cooperation in the Asian region.

A. Export and Investment Econometric Model
The first set of regression results based on the following model and includes all ten ESA
countries is presented in Table 1:
(1)

!!" = !! + !! !"#!" + !! !"#!" + !!"

The first regression run using the two variables, exports to China and inbound FDI, from
China showed high statistical significance, high residuals, and most importantly, positive signed
coefficients. The positive signed coefficients denote that exports to China from the host countries
and inbound FDI from China do, in fact, contribute to ESA countries’ real GDP per capita. All
else equal, a $1 million increase in exports leads to approximately $.02 increase in real GDP per
capita and a $1 million increase in FDI stock leads to $0.43 increase in real GDP per capita.
Although $0.02 sounds small, it is significant in per capita terms. Considering large countries
such as Indonesia with a population of 249.9 million people, $0.02 per capita translates to
$4.998million. In comparison to trade, FDI stock contributes 95% more to GDP per growth. A
robust adjusted R-squared value of 0.998 demonstrates that the estimated equation explain
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roughly 99.8% of the relationship variance between export and investment to real GDP per
capita growth.
In the second regression, the independent variable, FDI, is lagged by two years. The twoyear lag corrects for the precision error of the slow implementation of FDI, reducing serial
correlation in the error term. Lags take into account the unreliability of data because of timing.
Once a Chinese company decides to invest in another country, it takes time before the new firm
can fully operate. The nature of any FDI often requires time and effort to gather proper financial
funding, file for permit rights, and hire workers. It is somewhat unreasonable to believe that the
decision-making process and actual implementation of work all occur within one year.
Therefore, the original equation is adjusted to include a two-year lag effect of inbound FDI from
China. It is more reasonable to believe that a $1 million increase in FDI invested by China two
years ago affects this year’s growth. In regression (2), a $1 million increase in FDI stock lagged
by two years leads to $0.06 more GDP per capita than the uncorrected FDI stock variable. Each
lag, however, reduces the number of observations.
In the third regression, rather than using the variable exports to represent trade relations,
Trade (sum of host countries’ imports and exports with China) is used. Trade, however,
contributed less to GDP per capita than exports. The effect of a $1 million increase in exports on
GDP per capita is approximately $0.01 less than the effect of a $1million increase in trade on
real GDP per capita. This difference could indicate that exports to China has a greater impact on
real GDP per capita than imports from China, supporting the Export- Led Theory and the
argument that China’s need for resources as a new growing power contributes to economic
growth in ESA.
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The first two regressions, however, resulted in a low Durbin-Watson (DW) statistic of
1.12 and 1.36 respectively, suggesting positive serial correlation. The presence of autoregressive
behavior suggests that an important independent variable may be excluded from the model or the
functional form may be inappropriate. One standard procedure to address autoregressive
behavior is the Chochrane-Orcutt method, denoted by the AR(1) specifications in EViews. Thus,
we rerun the model with the first order autoregressive error specification (AR(1)) to test for
potential autoregressive behavior in the error terms. With the AR(1), the value of the DurbinWatson is 1.93, approximately equal to 2, indicating no serial correlation.
The 1% level statistical significance of the coefficients, the signs of the coefficients, and
the high adjusted R-squared for each investment type remain acceptable. Therefore, the
estimation equation that includes the AR(1) specification, exports, and two-year lagged effect of
inbound FDI from China is used throughout various regressions in this study.
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Table 1: Regression Results for all ESA Countries
(Dependent variable: real GDP per capita)
Sample: 2004 to 2013, 10 countries
Explanatory
Variable
(1)
Intercept
9043.673
(53.670)***
Exports

0.0217
(5.070)***

(2)
(3)
(4)
9233.36
9101.681
9146.535
(47.653)*** (24.827)*** (28.916)***
0.024
(5.444)***

Trade
FDI
Stocks

FDI Stocks
(-2)

0.016
(3.830)***
0.4325
(8.847)***
0.494
(8.784)***

AR(1)

Adjusted Rsquared
0.998
0.998
DurbinWatson
1.120
1.360
Note: t-statistics in
parenthesis
*Significant at 10% significance level
**Significant at % significance level
***Significant at 1% significance level
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0.027
(4.211)***

32!

0.381
(4.772)***

0.413
(5.578)***

0.419
(3.567)***

0.360
(2.995)***

0.999

0.999

2.01

1.94

B: Fixed Effects Model
(2)
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In the first set of regressions, results show that exports and investment from China lead to
growth in real GDP per capita in ESA countries. These two main variables, however, are not the
only ones that affect the dependent variable. As explained in Chapter IV, omitted variable bias
can influence the true value of the coefficients.
In fixed effects estimation, dummy variables are included in the regression that control
for observable and unobservable differences in countries’ GDP per capita growth, reducing
potential omitted variable bias. Given the fact that at different steps of development, trade and
investment relations with China affect each country’s GDP differently, fixed effects allow those
differences to be taken into account. If there were an explicit variable for degree of development
that truly capture the level of economic development, affecting benefits from trade and
development, then the fixed coefficient would not be necessary. The explicit variable could
capture economic development, education, or infrastructure (physical and legal).
The variation in effects for each country is obtained and shown in Table 2. Equation (2)
shows the interpretation of the fixed effects. In the first regression when all ten ESA countries
were observed, Japan, Republic of Korea, and Singapore had high positive results. This is
reasonable because they are the most advanced countries in ESA. Advanced countries’ may be
more efficient or have better trade agreements that help them gain more from trade and
investment relationships with China. The differences in fixed effects could indicate the different
tiers of development of ESA countries. Thus, to reduce omitted variable biasedness, countries
were separated into groups based on level of advancement. In group 2, only the developed
countries were observed: Japan, Republic of Korea, and Singapore. The third group consists of

!
!
!

33!

all developing countries in the study. The Newly Reformed countries are made up of economies
such as Vietnam, Cambodia, Lao, and Philippines who had the lowest effects.

Table2: Country Fixed Effects

(1) All ESA Countries
COUNTRY
Effect
Japan
22744.33
Rep. of
Korea
8879.12
Singapore
22869.26
Thailand
-7131.07
Malaysia
-4177.37
Indonesia
-8532.28
Vietnam
-8794.63
Cambodia
-8820.25
Lao PDR
-8751.19
Philippines
-8285.92
(3) All Developing
Countries
COUNTRY
Effect
Thailand
920.55
Malaysia
4289.10
Indonesia
-739.43
Vietnam
-1440.80
Cambodia
-1270.27
Lao PDR
-1180.06
Philippines
-579.09
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(2)
Developed Countries
COUNTRY
Japan

Effect
4494.72

Rep. of Korea
Singapore

-9364.08
4869.36

(4) Newly Reformed Countries
COUNTRY
Effect
Vietnam
67.06
Cambodia
-55.89
Lao PDR
-208.39
Philippines
197.23
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C: Regression Results For Different Tiers of Countries
(3)
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Several similarities and differences stand out across the regressions show in Table 3. In
all of the groups, Exports and two-year lagged inbound FDI contribute positively to real GDP per
capita growth although levels vary. Exports and two-year lagged inbound FDI affect developed
countries most and newly reformed countries the least. All else equal, a $1million increase in
exports leading to $0.01 increase in real GDP per capita is still substantial to developing
countries with low incomes. The Developing countries' regression result in the lowest D.W.
statistic of 1.88 with an statistically insignificant AR(1) suggesting positive serial correlation. On
the other hand, All Developing countries’ regression had a high D.W. statistic of 2.42,
suggesting negative serial correlation. There may be issues of multi-linearity. Two-year lagged
inbound FDI, however, impact newly reformed countries the least and the coefficient is not
statistically significant. This could be due to the short period of time observed in this study. It is
only in the past few years that Newly Reformed countries are experiencing the same level of
trade and investments that developed countries experienced in the early 2000s (refer to Graph 1
in Chapter 3). Moreover, due to the two-year lag, observations are further decreased. Therefore,
the latest years, in the 2010s, when newly reformed countries experienced the highest number of
trade and investments are not included in the regression.

!
!
!

35!

Table 3: Regression Results for Different Tiers of Countries
(Dependent variable: real GDP per capita)
Sample: 2004 to 2013
Explanatory
Variable
Intercept

All ESA
9146.535
(28.916)***

Developed
26877.44
(18.903)***

All Developing
2050.9
(7.890)***

Newly Reformed
151.1
(0.189)

Exports

0.027
(4.211)***

0.030
(2.390)**

0.010
(3.016)***

0.004
(3.05)***

FDI Stocks (-2)

0.413
(5.578)***

0.450
(3.255)***

0.135
(2.376)**

0.011
(.356)

AR(1)

0.360
(2.995)***

0.300
(1.27)

0.862
(6.728)***

1.050
(16.289)***

0.978
1.88

0.999
2.42

.998
2.12

Adjusted R-squared 0.999
Durbin-Watson
1.94
Note: t-statistics in parenthesis
*Significant at 10% significance level
**Significant at % significance level
***Significant at 1% significance level

D. Lagged real GDP per capita as an Independent Variable
(4)
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In the previous set of regressions shown in Table 3, the regressions with abnormal D.W.
statistics suggest serial correlation and multicollinearity. To address these issues, we place the
variable AR(1) with one-year lagged real GDP per capita as an independent variable. The results
are shown in Table 4. The application of the previous year’s real GDP per capita as an
independent variable suggests that the pattern of change in real GDP per capita is dependent on
its past real GDP per capita. Although the D.W. statistic for Developed countries’ improved,
D.W. statistic for Developing countries’ regression increased, suggesting negative serial
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correlation. With last year’s real GDP per capita, in every regression, the coefficients of exports
and inbound FDI decreased.

Table 4: Regression Results for Various Countries with Lagged Dependent Variable
(Dependent variable: real GDP per capita)
Sample: 2004 to 2013
Explanatory
Variable
Intercept

All ESA
5962.393
(6.675)***

Developed
18843.41
(3.734)***

All
Developing
627.860
(4.383)***

Exports

0.017
(3.742)***

0.020
(2.162)**

0.008
(4.426)***

0.001
(0.864)

FDI Stocks (-2)

0.325
(4.755)***

0.373
(2.743)***

0.043
(1.569)

0.011
(.829)

0.356
(3.74)***

0.305
(1.655)

0.639
(7.507)***

0.979
(14.787)***

0.999
2.50

0.997
2.17

real GDP per capita
(-1)

Adjusted R-squared 0.999
0.980
Durbin-Watson
1.97
1.91
Note: t-statistics in parenthesis
*Significant at 10% significance level
**Significant at % significance level
***Significant at 1% significance level

Newly Reformed
44.875
(0.897)

E. Regressions with Proxy Variables
In the fifth set of regressions shown in Table 5, we add variables such as openness, M2,
and human capital that also affect GDP per capita growth. The importance of these variables was
previously explained in Chapter IV. In Developed and All Developing countries, an increase in
one unit of openness leads to a very high increase in GDP per capita. Although an increase in
one unit of openness leading to $25252.24 increase in real GDP per capita sounds high, rarely do
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countries jump one unit of openness. The coefficients are statistically insignificant, likewise for
human capital and m2. An increase in human capital, measured by an additional year of
schooling, leads to $248.55 increase in GDP per capita with 10% statistical significance. Such
large impact is reasonable in newly reformed, developing countries where there is a low level of
schooling. An increase in schooling, thus human capital increases productivity levels. In
advanced countries such as Japan or Singapore where average number of schooling is above high
school level, an increase in one more year does not make a large difference in growth. The lack
of statistical significance in this set of regressions is partially due to correlation between two
independent variables. Correlation values between two variables are show in Table 6. Linear
correlation coefficient measures the strength and the direction of a linear relationship between
two variables. A correlation coefficient value close to the value of absolute one indicates a strong
linear relationship between two variables. A correlation coefficient greater than 0.8 is generally
described as strong, whereas a correlation less than 0.5 is generally described as weak, meaning
random, non-linear relationship between two variables. For example, human capital and M2
share a high correlation coefficient. This is likely due to the fact that in developed countries
where the financial institutions are well run, it is also likely to have highly educated people.
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Table 5: Regression Results with Additional Variables
(Dependent variable: real GDP per capita)
Sample: 2004 to 2013
Explanatory
Variable
Intercept

Developed
25864.7
16882.01
(7.169)***
(0.993)

Exports

All
Developing
2574.872
(3.119)*

0.025
(1.612)*

FDI Stocks(-2)

0.523
(3.149)***

Openness

25252.240
(1.203)

0.240
(0.610)

0.091
(1.248)

0.004
(3.558)***

0.007
(.204)

0.020
(0.579)

0.439
(.918)

Human Capital
0.238
(0.806)

963.972
(0.590)
0.0259
(1.018)

Adjusted R-squared 0.972
0.977
Durbin-Watson
1.82
1.95
Note: t-statistics in parenthesis
*Significant at 10% significance level
**Significant at % significance level
***Significant at 1% significance level
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0.005
(3.189)***

355.704
(0.580)

m2

AR(1)

194.891
(0.236)

Newly Reformed
-683.571
(-0.934)
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0.921
(10.185)***

1.052
(14.426)***

248.547
(1.697)*
1.137
(13.741)***

0.998
2.877

0.998
2.37

0.998
2.38

Table 6:Correlation
Human
OPENNESS Exports M2
Capital
FDI
FDI (-2) Y(-1)
OPENNESS
1.00
-0.19
0.11
0.19
0.27
0.26
-0.03
Exports
-0.19
1.00
0.78
0.76
0.00
0.05
0.70
M2
0.11
0.78
1.00
0.79
0.15
0.18
0.77
Human
Capital
0.19
0.76
0.79
1.00
0.33
0.35
0.77
FDI
0.27
0.00
0.15
0.33
1.00
0.95
0.45
FDI(-2)
0.26
0.05
0.18
0.35
0.95
1.00
0.42
Y(-1)
-0.03
0.70
0.77
0.77
0.45
0.42
1.00
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CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSION
A. Summary of Findings
It is peculiar that in both All ESA countries’ and All Developing countries’ regressions,
Indonesia with its large population and rapid economic growth, had very low fixed effects. This
could be a result of China and Indonesia’s complex relationship. Although China’s demand for
raw materials has created significant opportunities for Indonesia to export natural resources, the
two are also competitors in producing low-tech manufactures such as shoes, textiles, and
garments. When the ASEAN-China Free Trade Area (ACFTA) was implemented in 2010 at the
same the global economic slowdown hit, huge stockpiles of manufactured Chinese goods were
dumped into Indonesia while China created barriers to its market, leading to the closings of many
manufacturing firms in Indonesia. The resulting pattern of trade in which Indonesia exports
primary products to China and imports manufacturing goods has come under strong criticism as
a “neocolonial” one, creating perceptions of China as an exploitative economic actor, and
leading to the adoption of defensive measures (Bruce 2014).
It is evident throughout the multiple regressions run that trade relations with China and
particularly inbound FDI from China contribute to ESA real GDP per capita. Regression results
related to exports and inbound FDI are robust in nearly all estimates run (Table 1,3,4,5 and
Appendix A) with D.W. statistics close to 2, 98% adjusted R-squared, and positive coefficients
for exports and FDI. In this study, developed countries such as Japan, Singapore and Korea
benefit more from economic relations with China. In comparison, developing countries enjoy a
lower level of impact, although still positive. China’s growth could potentially impact
developing countries more in the future since heavy investment from China and exports to China
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have just started in the recent years. Indeed China and the rest of ESA depend on western
markets to prosper and grow but through China’s success as the “manufacture machine” of the
world, China is slowly transforming into an impactful player. In the past two decades, it has
increased its role as an importer and investor in the Asian region. Proven in this study, China’s
rise drives other Asian countries’ economies to grow. The economic gains of trade
interdependence in Asia calls for regional cooperation.

B. Asian Regional Cooperation
The 1997 Asian financial crisis marked the beginning of Asian regionalism. When the
Asian Tigers were hit badly with a regional financial crisis that started quickly in Thailand,
Beijing helped stabilize the regional economic situation by not devaluing its own currency. At
the time, Western institutions seemed impotent in saving the crisis-hit Asian economies. Since
then, talks of regional cooperation began to momentum. Today, organizations such as
ASEAN+3, which accounts for Southeast Asian countries and Japan, Korea, and China help
build greater economic and security ties in the region.
C. Suggestions for Future Research
One of the major setbacks in this study was the lack of data for China’s OFDI. We were
only able to obtain OFDI data for the years 2004-2013. With the application of lagged effects
and country groupings, observations were very low in each regression. A larger data set would
provide more information about the trade and investment factors that contribute to ESA
countries’ GDP growth over time, especially if the data set covered watershed events such as the
Asian Financial Crisis. To adjust for serial correlation, more inputs could be included in the
regressions to account for possible variables unique to differing countries. For trade, it would be
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beneficial to include industry sector variables to distinguish what industries countries complete
with China. With more data, in both the extented number of years and variables, the proper
model will be established.
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Appendix A
Regression Results for all ESA countries
(Dependent variable: real GDP per capita)
Sample: 2004 to 2013
Explanatory Variable
Intercept

(1)
10446.74
(19.782)***

Exports

Open

-166.781
(-.058)

FDI Stocks(-2)

0.436
(4.704)***

Human Capital

(2)
10360.65
(3.715)***

(3)
12758.12
(4.766)***

(4)
8771.126
(5.189)***

0.028
(4.162)***

0.030
(4.730)***

0.023
(4.868)***

0.450
(4.042)***

0.494
(4.621)***

0.410
(4.758)***

-153.978
(-0.438)

-49.524
(-0.154)

-13.580
(-0.076)

-28.255
(-2.731)***

-23.837
(-3.074)***

M2

0.320
(3.441)***

real GDP per capita(-1)
AR(1)

0.443
(3.645)***

Adjusted R-squared
0.998
Durbin-Watson
2.11
Note: t-statistics in parenthesis
*Significant at 10% significance level
**Significant at % significance level
***Significant at 1% significance level

!
!
!

0.357
(2.946)***

0.312
(2.255)**

0.998
1.94

0.998
1.844
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0.998
1.89

Appendix B
Regression Results for Developed Countries
(Dependent variable: real GDP per capita)
Sample: 2004 to 2013; 3 countries
Explanatory Variable
Intercept

(1)
25864.70
(7.169)***

Exports

Open

FDI Stocks(-2)

(2)
16882.01
(0.993)

(3)
15234.48
(0.942)

(4)
16875.83
(2.009)*

0.025
(1.612)

0.235
(1.716)*

0.028
(2.911)***

25252.24
(1.203)
0.523
(3.149)***

Human Capital

0.240
(0.606)

0.078
(0.212)

963.973
(0.590)

2085.285
(1.286)

1369.229
(1.380)

-65.622
(-2.28)**

-53.850
(-2.555)**

M2

real GDP per capita(-1)
AR(1)

0.127
(0.652)
0.238
(0.806)

Adjusted R-squared
0.972
Durbin-Watson
1.82
Note: t-statistics in parenthesis
*Significant at 10% significance level
**Significant at % significance level
***Significant at 1% significance level
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0.176
(0.697)

0.259
(1.018)

0.330
(1.017)

0.977
1.95

0.982
1.62
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0.984
1.58

Appendix C
Regression Results for Developing Countries
(Dependent variable: real GDP per capita)
Sample: 2004 to 2013; 7 countries
Explanatory Variable
Intercept

(1)
2574.872
(3.119)***

Exports

Open

355.704
(0.580)

FDI Stocks(-2)

0.091
(1.249)

Human Capital

(2)
3458.591
(4.111)***

(3)
3694.434
(0.705)

(4)
1283.562
(4.075)***

0.012
(4.383)***

0.008
(2.473)**

0.009
(4.484)***

0.238
(4.120)***

0.227
(2.781)**

0.120
(2.567)**

-236.415
(-2.006)**

-187.720
(-0.339)

-64.480
(-2.125)**

-4.330
(-2.442)**

-1.364
(-0.890)

M2

real GDP per capita(-1)
AR(1)

0.584
(6.168)***
0.921
(10.185)***

Adjusted R-squared
0.998
Durbin-Watson
2.88
Note: t-statistics in parenthesis
*Significant at 10% significance level
**Significant at % significance level
***Significant at 1% significance level
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0.653
(4.063)***

0.829
(5.718)***

0.999
2.06

0.999
2.12
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0.999
2.40

Appendix D
Regression Results for all Newly Reformed Countries
(Dependent variable: real GDP per capita)
Sample: 2004 to 2013; 4 Countries
Explanatory Variable
Intercept

(1)
-164.694
(-0.089)

Exports

Open

368.334
(2.430)**

FDI Stocks(-2)

-0.002
(-0.072)

Human Capital

(2)
-683.571
(-0.934)

(3)
-601.279
(0.716)

(4)
404.498
(2.266)**

0.004
(3.558)***

0.005
(3.291)***

0.003
(2.067)**

0.020
(0.578)

0.019
(0.471)

0.029
(1.680)

248.547
1.697*

228.960
(1.390)

-88.913
(-2.028)*

0.326
(0.686)

0.250
(0.340)

M2

real GDP per capita(-1)
AR(1)

1.152
(10.867)***
1.033
(15.413)***

Adjusted R-squared
0.997
Durbin-Watson
2.40
Note: t-statistics in parenthesis
*Significant at 10% significance level
**Significant at % significance level
***Significant at 1% significance level
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1.137
(13.741)***

1.135
(11.126)***

0.998
2.38

0.997
2.56
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0.997
2.67
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